From the beginning, the Arab-Israeli GAA has been plagued by discord and disagreement. A fundamental disagreement was the extent of the responsibility that States parties should assume for the criminal and often violent activities of irregulars crossing demarcation borders. The scale of such infiltration in the early 1950s worried Israelis, and the failure of UNTSO and several Arab states to contain it effectively triggered serious retaliation by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which itself also violated the GAA. Perhaps the most serious disagreement concerned the nature of the agreements signed. While Israel regarded them as permanent for the demarcation lines as finite borders and was only waiting for the final phase of the signing of the comprehensive peace treaties, the Arab States interpreted them only as long-term ceasefire agreements that did not end their status as belligerents and did not give coherence to their various provisions. The Chairman of the United Nations Joint Commission, Colonel Garrison B. Coverdale (United States), urged a solution to be found within the Joint Ceasefire Commission in a friendly spirit and a Spirit of the United Nations. After some hesitation, this procedure was accepted and finally an agreement was reached under which the ceasefire demarcation line was changed to place Wadi Fukin under Jordanian authority, which in turn agreed to transfer uninhabited but fertile territory south of Bethlehem to Israeli control. [9] 1. In accordance with the above-mentioned principles and the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 and 16 November 1948, a general armistice shall be concluded between the armed forces of the two Parties by land, sea and air. Ceasefire agreements were to serve only as interim agreements until they were replaced by lasting peace treaties. However, it took three decades to reach a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, and it took another 15 years to reach a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. To date, no peace treaty has been signed between Israel and Lebanon[N 1] or between Israel and Syria.
The agreement with Lebanon was signed on March 23, 1949. [2] The main points were as follows: by the end of the 1947-1949 war, Palestinian Arabs had usurped their prerogatives and political “voices” as selfish and selfish Arab leaders who faced the challenges of “shared leadership, extremely limited finances, the absence of centrally organized armed forces, and reliable allies.” [1] After the 1947-1949 war, it took the Palestinians another four decades to impose their own independent political voice, which was no longer repressed by political leaders in Damascus, Cairo, Amman, the Arab League and elsewhere. This finally happened in December 1988. For the Arab States, the ceasefire agreements have not put an end to physical or political hostilities; they were only a temporary political interlude in the ongoing efforts to isolate, destroy and delegitimize Israel on the international stage. For the Palestinians and the entire Arab world, their defeat against the Zionists was seen only as a failed “battle” in the longer war to bury Zionism and remove Israel from the political landscape of the Middle East. Arab states continued on this path until after the war in June 1967, when some Arab states and leaders began to question whether supporting the Palestinian cause and destroying Israel was worth sacrificing labor, money, and delays in national economic development. In the early 1970s, Egypt was the first Arab state to establish and implement the calculation that ending the state of war with Israel was its primary national interest – not to abandon the Palestinian cause, but to place its own sovereign interests above the destruction of Israel or the liberation of Palestine. The Israeli-Jordanian agreement states: “. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect in any way the rights, claims and positions of any of the Parties in the peaceful settlement of Palestinian matters, since the provisions of this Agreement shall be dictated exclusively by military considerations” (art. II.2): “The ceasefire demarcation lines set out in Articles V and VI of this Agreement shall be agreed by the Parties, without prejudice to future territorial settlements or border lines or related claims of a Party.” (Art. VI.9)[3] Negotiations on the division of Jordanian waters in the early 1950s did not yield results, so Israel had to move forward with its own plan to divert much of these waters to the south of the country. Syria`s attempt to divert the sources of the Banyas River in 1965 provoked Israeli threats and attacks that ended Syrian diversionary efforts.
These tensions reached their peak in May 1967, when Egypt responded to a call for help from Syria and moved its army to positions along the Israeli border in Sinai, withdrawing the UN emergency force from the border. Israel`s response was a successful offensive that led to the total conquest of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights. This development rendered the Israeli-Syrian GAA of 1949 irrelevant. The legal vacuum was finally filled after the October 1973 war. The “separation of forces” agreement brokered by the United States in May 1974 by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger led to a new demarcation line that brought the town of Qunaytra back under Syrian control and has since been monitored by UNDOF, a United Nations special observer force. 3. The Parties to this Agreement may at any time amend this Agreement or any of its provisions by mutual agreement or suspend its application, with the exception of Articles I and II. In the absence of mutual agreement and after the entry into force of this Convention one year after its signature, either Party may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a Conference of representatives of both Parties to consider, revise or suspend any provision of this Convention other than articles I and II. Participation in this Conference shall be compulsory for Parties.
2. This Agreement, which was concluded in accordance with Security Council Resolution of 16. November 1948, which called for the establishment of a ceasefire to eliminate the threat to peace in Palestine and facilitate the transition from that armistice to lasting peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement is reached between the parties, except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this article. On March 16, 1954, Israelis in the settlement of Ein Gev, 130 Dunum began ploughing land near the settlement, which belonged to the demilitarized Arab population of Nuqeib, which violated the 1950 oral agreement in Samara that both sides should retain and treat said land until the problem was resolved. The new military borders for Israel, as set out in the agreements, covered about 78 percent of Mandatory Palestine as it stood after independence from Transjordan (now Jordan) in 1946. The Arab-populated areas that were not controlled by Israel before 1967 were the Jordanian-ruled West Bank and the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip. 4. The establishment of a ceasefire between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an indispensable step towards the settlement of the armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine. The most difficult problem that triggered occasional violence was the widespread infiltration of Palestinians (mainly 1948 refugees) across the armistice demarcation lines. These actions provoked Israeli retaliatory attacks and called into question the viability of Article II of the agreement.
Nevertheless, both sides were reluctant to destroy the foundations of their GAA and continued to use their mechanisms to exchange mutual grievances and maintain the fragile status quo. The non-human countries designated by the GAA were divided by mutual agreement; the biweekly convoy to the Israeli enclave of hebrew University on Mount Scopus was authorized to supply the Israeli police stationed there and to regularly replace the police; The mutual vulnerability of Jerusalem`s citizens has led both sides to keep the city`s demarcation lines silent most of the time. The conquest of Jerusalem and the West Bank by Israeli forces in June 1967 ended the applicability of the Israeli-Jordanian GAA, as neither the Jordanian civilian government nor the Jordanian army ever returned to these areas. The 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel led to the end of the Israeli-Jordanian GAA. The Israel-Lebanon GAA was signed on March 23, 1949 by Lieutenant Colonel Mordekhai Makleff for Israel and Lieutenant Colonel Tawfiq Salim for Lebanon in Raʾs Naqura. Israeli forces, which had withdrawn from the parts of southern Lebanon they occupied in the summer of 1948, agreed to establish armistice demarcation lines along the former international borders, bringing more stability to Israeli-Lebanese relations for more than two decades. However, after the “Black September” of 1970, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the various Palestinian guerrilla groups moved the site of their operations from Jordan to the refugee camps in Lebanon, making the Israeli-Lebanese border a recurring battlefield. .